Tariq Toffa, Johannesburg Community Manager
Apartheid policies in South Africa made for ineffective cities. Fragmented and segmented, Johannesburg has an ambivalent relationship with public transport. Historically, more affluent, mostly northern white suburbs were provided with extensive transport infrastructure, such as electric trams (1906-48) and later highways (see Fig. 1). By contrast, the denser and poorer black townships, mostly in the south, were provided with limited and marginalised rail and bus public transport. Yet out of desperate need by being located far away from major industrial and commercial centres, in the 1970s a mini-bus taxi industry emerged, which has grown to serve approximately 72 percent of all public transport users.
Despite a number of post-1994 initiatives, urban transport system problems persist. Recently (2006-2012), in the largest Public Private Partnership yet launched in South Africa, between the Gauteng Provincial Government and Bombela International Consortium, a rapid rail project worth R20 billion (US$ 2 billion) was implemented. The “Gautrain” rapid rail network consists of two spines: one (south-north) linking Johannesburg and Pretoria, and the other (west-east) linking the Sandton business district and OR Tambo International airport. Coupled with this, in 2007 the City began constructing an ambitious Bus Rapid Transit System (BRT) known as the “Rea Vaya” (see Fig. 2).
The new systems address speed, efficiency, and traffic decongestion, as well as problems of safety, facilities, and crime that have affected the taxi industry. Crucially, the BRT in particular improves access of marginalised communities to industrial and commercial centers: firstly linking the townships in the south to Johannesburg’s CBD (phase 1A and 1B), and subsequently linking Alexandra township in the north with Sandton and Johannesburg’s CBD (phase 1C). Together with the Gautrain, it is envisioned as a key catalyst for the city’s Transit Orientated Development (TOD) plan for urban regeneration and economic development at transit hubs. Hence two BRT routes (phase 1B and 1C) will become “corridors” of mixed-use development.
In contrast to the BRT, the Gautrain, in catering purely for the affluent car owner/user, from a social perspective clearly suffers from the criticism of class/mobility-related exclusion; although this could be offset by a BRT system that, unlike the Gautrain where there is no clarity in providing mixed-income residential development around its stations, clearly allows for mixed-income along BRT corridors.
Nonetheless, on the whole, both projects direct growth toward former white group areas which are developed, and not toward new corridor and nodal development in previously underdeveloped areas; and so they also do not remove the burden of excessive and reverse commuting. The terminal infrastructure developments of both projects, too, are located away from the marginal communities’ location.
Other issues include the sustained opposition by some organisations within the taxi industry, which the BRT wishes to absorb, and the high cost of the BRT (R35 million / US$ 3.5 million per km, and at least R7 million / US$ 700,000 per BRT station). It is unclear how much investment was essential for the long-term operational sustainability of the project, and how much could also have been creatively employed for the project to balance other more social priority purposes.
At first glance the Gautrain/BRT initiative appears a master-stroke of integrative urban transport; yet while it is still incomplete and without a full-scale evaluation of its impact, particularly for poor neighbourhoods and travel patterns, from a social perspective, the jury is still out.
Fig. 1: Early twentieth century electric trams (Beavon 2001)
Fig. 2: Historic racial segregation, with new BRT and Gautrain routes (map by author)